The Strange Case of Mr. Hyde and Dr. Jekyll: General Pervez
Musharraf
J. Arya (BR TIMES)Introduction
The media material on General Pervez Musharraf presents
extremely conflicting and contradictory pictures. Reporting from
various sources with carefully inserted biases leads to utter
confusion. This article borrows its title from a phrase used by
Brig. (r) S. N. Sachadeva in his op-ed for the Daily Excelsior
and by Arvind Lavakare in his article for Rediff News Service.
It adequately sums up the difficulty in assessing General
Musharraf .
This article attempts to collate information that has emerged
from various sources about the General and puts together a
`composite'. This technique is routinely used in police work to
convert a description of a suspect from many witnesses into a
photograph. In the process of doing this it has also become
possible to address some specific patterns in the coverage of
General Musharraf so wherever possible a `composite' has been
built up on these topics.
We begin the article by discussing General Musharraf's
childhood and possible influences therein. In the next section
we examine the information available about General Musharraf's
military and political career. In the section after that we
briefly cover the views held by various commentators on General
Musharraf . Then we look carefully at `composites' on the
following commonly seen motifs in writings about General
Musharraf ; `Musharraf : AtaPak v/s AtaTurk', `Musharraf and the
West', and `Musharraf and the Pan-Islamist Clique'. Lastly we
present our concluding remarks.
In our approach we are faced with severe limitations on the
amount of information available about contacts between General
Musharraf and the Chinese Government and the North Korean
Government. Thus it is difficult to establish the exact nature
of his impact on ties with these two nations. These are of
importance as these nations have contributed heavily to making
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Childhood
August 11, 1943: General Musharraf was born at Kucha Saadullah
Khan behind Golcha cinema in Daryaganj, Delhi. Pervez Musharraf
was the second of three brothers born in an educated Syed
family. After the creation of Pakistan the family chose to
settle in Karachi. The journey to Pakistan was complicated by
the fact that Musharraf's father was asked to transport a large
sum of money at the behest of the Pakistani government. Pervez's
father Syed Musharrafuddin, a graduate of Aligarh University,
worked as a cashier in the Directorate General of Civil Supplies
in Delhi. Upon moving to Pakistan , he was absorbed into the
Pakistan Foreign Service. General Musharraf's mother hailed from
a conservative family but with the support of her progressive
father she was able to get an education. She graduated from
Delhi's Indraprastha College with a Masters in English
literature.
1949 - 1956: Musharraf spent this part of his childhood in
Turkey. His father served in the Pakistani Embassy in Ankara and
later as the Pakistani permanent representative to CENTO. He
also became the chairman of the Turkish-Pakistani Friendship
Association. Pervez Musharraf came to Turkey when he was seven
and spent six years in Turkey.
In Turkey Pervez Musharraf made some interesting friends
including Ilhan Yigitbasoglu, the head of the Protocol
Department of the Foreign Ministry now serving as Turkish
Ambassador to Helsinki. Pervez (along with his brothers) also
learnt Turkish here under the supervision of a German tutor. His
grasp of Turkish is reputed to be better than his grasp of Urdu,
the national language of Pakistan .
(It may be noted at this point that Musharaff-ud-Din retired
in 1974 as a Joint Secretary while his wife (Pervez's mother)
devoted her time between her family and serving the
International Labor Organization. She retired in 1987. It is
said that Musharraf -ud-din (and his wife) took American
citizenship at some point before his death in 1999.
1957-1961: After returning from Ankara, the Musharrafs
settled in Karachi, then capital of Pakistan. Pervez attended
Saint Patrick's High School, Karachi and Forman Christian
College, Lahore. His exact grades in these institutions are not
known, however many reports speak of him having average grades
but an avid interest in sports.
Influences
It is impossible to say what exactly influenced General
Musharraf as a child but he repeatedly emphasizes the following:
"I was strongly attracted to Kemal Ataturk's model of
leadership. He transformed Turkey from being the `sick man of
Europe' to being the a very advanced nation". "When I was a
child in Turkey, my father was in the Pakistan embassy. We had
two defence attaches who used to wear these beautiful glamorous
uniforms. I used to look at them and I was extremely impressed
by their smartness. That was the time I also thought, I must
wear such uniforms."
The General also seems to remember events from the times of
the Partition with some degree of clarity. These stories are
very common among refugees of the partition (Mohajirs as they
are called in Pakistan ). It is unclear if these are real events
or some kind of meta-narrative that he has latched on to.
Summary
The repeated reference to his `Syed' (the highest level of the
Islamic `caste' system, comprising families tracing bloodlines
to the Prophet of Islam) roots indicates that Musharraf is
conscious of social strata. It is clear that General Musharraf
is exactly where he craved to be, i.e. in the Army wielding
power beyond the dreams of most others. The attraction to Kemal
Ataturk goes back some distance. Meta-narrative or otherwise,
the events of the Partition have left their mark on him.
Service Record
The Pakistan army plays a very active role in politics. It is
often impossible to segregate army careers and political
activities in Pakistan . General Musharraf's career is a classic
case of this, i.e. the extension of a military position into a
political career. It appears that in the early part of his
career Pervez Musharraf was purely a soldier; where exactly his
career entered the political sphere is impossible to pinpoint.
There are some guesses and these are presented here. We have
also attempted to portray plausible motivations for some of the
events and patterns in his career.
1961: Pervez Musharraf joined the Pakistan Military Academy
(PMA) at Kakul (NWFP). He shifted his permanent residence to
Gujranwala in the Punjab and declared it as his hometown. Some
analysts see this as one more action in a pattern commonly seen
among Mohajirs, i.e. the desire to project a `changed' status.
Some Mohajirs affect virulent anti-India sentiments in order to
gain acceptance in Pakistani society.
1961-1964: Somewhere in this period Musharraf is punished for
indiscipline.
April 19, 1964: Musharraf completed the 29th PMA Long Course
at Kakul and joined the 16th (SP) Field Artillery Regt as a 2nd
Lieutenant. His PA number is PA-6920. The 16 (SP) Field
Artillery Regiment was commanded by Lt.Col. Akram Chaudhary and
was attached to 1st Armored Division as the divisional
artillery. It is said that General Musharraf was second (passing
out as Battalion Junior Under Officer) in his class (29th PMA)
and Lt. General Ali Quli Khan came first and was therefore the
sword of honor recipient.
1965: The 16 (SP) Artillery saw action in three sectors; Khem
Karan, Lahore and Sialkot. During the 1965 war in the Chawinda
(Sialkot) sector in Punjab at night, Pervez Musharraf's battery
was bombarded by Indian artillery. Musharraf , then a Lieutenant
however, off-loaded ammunition from the burning gun before it
could explode and refused to abandon his position. For this he
was decorated with the Imtiyaz-i-Sanad (Mention in the
Dispatches). General Javed Ashraf Kazi (then most probably a
Lieutenant in the Pakistan army), currently Musharraf's Federal
minister for Communications and Transport witnessed this event.
General Musharraf himself considers his escaping death here a
miracle.
1966: Musharraf most likely volunteered for a transfer to a
formation known then as the 19th Baluch Regiment. In those days
this formation comprised the core of the Pakistan Army's
irregular warfare unit, the Special Services Group (SSG). It is
here that he learns how to parachute; the training was done at
Cherat in NWFP. It is in this period that Musharraf first came
into contact with Americans in the CIA. Among those he probably
met here are Robert Buckley, Chuck Lord, and Robert Dunn. It is
alleged that the Pakistan army patronized Sheikh Mubarak Ali
Shah Gilani, a radical Islamist preacher to setup the `Climbers
Club of Pakistan'. Some of this club's facilities were used to
train SSG people in mountain climbing. If this were true then
Pervez Musharraf would most probably have come into contact with
Sheikh Gilani at this time. It is estimated that Pervez
Musharraf served in the SSG for approximately 7 years. It may
also be noted that Shiekh Gilani is seen as a sort of father
figure to many Pakistani terrorists presently active in the
Kashmir region.
1967-68: He was promoted to Captain and spent time on the
East Pakistan's border with India. As a Captain he headed the
`Kamal' Company of the SSG and participated in the
reconnaissance missions aimed at planning offensives against
Indian Lines-of-Communication in the region. On December 28,
1968 he married Sehba. In 1968, he returned to the Infantry
School in Quetta from Chittagong. At infantry school he caused a
serious instance of insubordination. He argued with a senior
officer about the quality of the food in the presence of troops.
This in turn caused an act of collective indiscipline on part of
the troops. It is likely that for this he faced disciplinary
action.
1971: It is said that Musharraf served as a Company Commander
(Major) in the 2 Battalion of the SSG. This would be an
unusually fast promotion cycle. It is likely that he served as a
captain, and then was made acting company commander and
subsequently promoted after the war. The activities of the 2nd
Battalion SSG in 1971 are not well profiled, sections relating
to its functioning have been deleted from the Hamoodur Rehman
report. It is however known from the report that the 2nd
Battalion SSG saw action either around Dacca or in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts in the 1971 war. In this period the SSG
had come under severe criticism for carrying out heinous war
crimes. It is unclear if Musharraf was ever mixed up in any of
those. The selective deletion of the activities of the 2
Battalion SSG is nevertheless curious.
1972-1973: He finished his second tenure at the SSG. At this
point he was most likely still a Major. Towards the end of his
tenure his unit was deployed in Gilgit (Search).
He planned to take a plane back to Rawalpindi (so as to go on
leave) but an avalanche caused him to postpone his visit. In the
meanwhile the plane he was to travel on crashed and all lives on
board were lost; this General Musharraf considers his second
providential escape from death.
1973-1979: Musharraf attended the Command and Staff College,
Quetta and the National Defence College. He also held various
intermediate posts like Brigade Major in an infantry brigade. As
a Lt. Colonel Musharraf commanded a Field Artillery regiment, he
also served in the DMO. As a Colonel, he commanded two
self-propelled Artillery Regiments.
In 1979 General Zia Ul Haq, the Pakistani Chief Of Armed
Staff, conducted a coup toppling the democratically elected
government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After the coup General Zia
tried Zulfiqar Bhutto in court and sentenced him to death.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is hanged on April 4, 1979. By this time Zia
proclaimed Martial law in the country and awarded himself the
title of Chief Martial Law Administrator.
1979-1985: Musharraf catches the eye of General Zia-ul-Haq
(who is also a Mohajir) and Lt. General Mirza Aslam Beg (also a
Mohajir with family ties to Central Asia and Afghanistan). It is
said that General Zia-ul-Haq chose Musharraf for advancement as
he was a devout Deobandi and was strongly recommended by other
religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami.
General Zia set up a series of martial law administration
offices in the various sub-units of Pakistan. Musharraf served
in a District Martial Law Administration HQ.
Musharraf became closely involved in the job of preparing the
`Mujaheddin' for the Anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan. In this
effort he worked closely with Mahmud Ali Durrani, Mohammed Aziz
Khan, and officers of the CIA. At the Pakistani end the process
involved identifying madrassahs for indoctrination, military
training, and planning the logistics of the covert war. It is in
this period that the Binori Madrassa (Karachi), the Darul Uloom
Haqqania (Akora Khattak), and the Jamiya Ashrafiya (Lahore)
began their meteoric rise. It is during this time that Musharraf
came into contact with the Harakat ul Mujaheedin (HuM). The HuM
developed as nodal body in the Afghan Jihad. There are also
reports of contact with narcotics smugglers.
It is also suggested that Musharraf secretly attended at
least one course at the Green Berets training school at Fort
Bragg. Accounts indicate Musharraf's performance in these
courses was above average. Some regarded him as a `natural' in
the field of Psywar techniques.
This activity most probably marked him out for a promotion,
upon receiving which he served as Deputy Director Military
Operations. He also served on the directing staff of NDC in this
period. The Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) carries out
the physical work of coordinating the various operations
conducted by the Pakistan Army and the Directing Staff decide
how best to train future generations of officers to deal with
military situations. In some sense these two postings comprise
the very core of the Pakistan Army?s operational philosophy.
1985-1987: He was most likely given command of the 323
Infantry Brigade at Dansam in the Northern Areas. Here under
General Zia's encouragement he built up a `Special Snow Warfare
Force' at Khapalu and launched an attack on the Indian position
at Bilafond Pass. The attack captured two intermediate posts but
the Indian army retained the pass. General Zia was satisfied and
rewarded Musharraf . This action made him the Pakistan Army?s
top mountain warfare expert.
Subsequently however the Indian Army dispatched its own
mountain warfare giant (a recipient of the USI medal for
reconnaissance) Brigadier General Chandan S. Nugyal. Under
General Nugyal?s direction and with a display of stunning
bravery by Subedar Bana Singh, the men of the 8th Jammu and
Kashmir Light Infantry (102 Infantry Brigade) of the Indian Army
retook the positions at `Qaid Peak' and thus once again
dominated the Bilafond pass.
The Pakistanis never reconciled themselves to the loss of
`Qaid Peak' and the Pakistani Government does not publicly admit
to its loss. Visiting dignitaries are often shown the peak and
told that it is a Pakistani held position.
May 1988: Using an SSG unit and some `spare Jihadis' General
Musharraf suppressed the Shi'ite revolt that demanded an
independent `Karakoram State'. It is alleged that Musharraf
transported a large number of Wahhabi Pashtun tribesmen from the
NWFP and Afghanistan, commanded by Osama Bin Laden, to Gilgit to
teach the Shi?ites a lesson.
Musharraf then started the policy of bringing in Punjabis and
Pashtuns from outside and settling them in Gilgit and Baltistan
in order to reduce the Kashmiri Shi?ites to a minority in their
traditional land and this policy continues to this day.
During these operations in the Siachen area and in the
Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), Musharraf developed a
close personal friendship with Lt.General Javed Nasir, who was
then Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He
currently serves as Musharraf's Advisor on intelligence matters.
Musharraf also befriended Major General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi
(then a Brigadier). Major General Abbasi was later arrested and
jailed during Benazir Bhutto's time for conspiring to overthrow
her and establish an Islamic state. Musharraf also build strong
ties to Lt.General Mohammed Aziz Khan and Mohammed Rafique
Tarar. It is interesting to note that eventually Lt. General
Mohammed Aziz and President Tarar helped Musharraf conduct and
`legalize? his coup against the Nawaz Sharif government.
President Tarar however was later `retired' from post of the
President of Pakistan .
In 1988, Musharraf worked with an institutional policy that
encouraged Anti-Shi'ite outfits like the Sipaha Saheba Pakistan
(SSP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in an effort to keep
Shi'ites down. This error of judgment proved costly in the
future as sectarian violence spiraled uncontrollably in Pakistan
.
He was up for selection to the post of Military Secretary to
then Military Dictator General Zia ul Haq. However he is not
selected for the post. Oddly enough a few weeks later the man
selected in his place perished in the C-130 crash that also
killed General Zia. This according to General Musharraf is his
third great escape.
1989-1990: He most likely commanded the divisional artillery
at Bhawalpur attached to the 1st Armoured Division at Multan. He
held several staff postings, which include Deputy Military
Secretary at the Military Secretary's Branch, member of the War
Wing of the National Defence College.
In 1989, he most likely gave an interview to an American
scholar (Robert Wirsing) on sojourn in Pakistan , where he said
" It would be insane to attack India via the Siachin, it
would make more sense to attack at a more southern point closer
to their lines of communication."
Some analysts feel it is in this period that Musharraf and
his friend Mohammed Aziz first conceived the Kargil invasion.
1990-1991: Musharraf attended a course at the Royal College
of Defence Studies (RCDS), in the United Kingdom. His
course-mates General(r) Ashok Mehta and Major Gen (r) B.S. Malik
recall him as a `sophisticated?, `pleasant' and `affable' man.
Further they say that he was an `an extrovert', and `not Islamic
or fundamentalist'. At RCDS he studied for a year and befriended
Colonel (now Lt. General) Ethem Erdagi of the Turkish Army. He
also chose a research project titled "Impact of the Arms Race in
the Indo- Pakistan Subcontinent".
In his coursework he performed well, and earned the following
remark on his report from then Commandant, General Sir Anthony
Walker.
"A capable, articulate and extremely personable officer, who
made a most valuable impact here. His country is fortunate to
have the services of a man of his undeniable quality".
Brigadier Musharraf left RCDS with a Masters Degree.
1991-1993: Upon his return to Pakistan , He was promoted to
Major General and given the command of the 40 Infantry Division
at Okara (Punjab) on 15th Jan 1991. At this point the Afghan war
was drawing to a close. There was a glut of `Mujaheddin' in
Pakistan . At the same time a series of operations by Indian
security forces in Kashmir have driven the insurgency of 1989 on
to the back foot. It is at this time that the Pakistan army made
a decision to move the out-of-work afghan war veterans into the
Kashmir Jihad. There was also severe infighting among the
Mujaheddin factions and soon Pakistan's Afghan policy became
unworkable.
1993-1995: He served as Director General Military Operations
(DGMO) at the General Headquarters. Here he aided Naseerullah
Babar in the conduct of the Taliban Operation. He also conducted
two crucial GHQ-level exercises; "Exercise Tri Star", which was
aimed at exposing senior service officers and select civilians
to the planning and execution of joint military operations, and
"Exercise Zarb-e-Mujahid-II", which was evolved to test the
concept of establishing a Field Army HQ and work out modalities
for moving a number of division-size formations to their
operational locations.
He also persuaded his superiors to withdraw troops from an
internal security operation (most likely Operation Blue Fox or
some corollary to it) in the Sindh province. Some have
attributed this in part to his ability to reach an
`understanding? with the target of the operations, Shri. Altaf
Hussain, the head of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The MQM
is an organization representing the interests of partition
refugees i.e. people of Musharraf ?s family background.
1995-1998: On October 21, 1995 he was promoted to Lieutenant
General and made CC-I Corps Mangla and possible moved later as
the CC-II Corps in Multan. Whenever GeneralJehangir Karamat
traveled abroad, GeneralMusharraf was acting COAS.
This period saw the return of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime
Minister of Pakistan . This period sees Musharraf jockeying for
political patronage from Nawaz Sharif. As Corps Commander Mangla,
General Musharraf claims he had another brush with death as he
turned down an offer to take a helicopter ride from Mangla to
Rawalpindi that eventually crashed killing the crew and
passengers.
May 1998: The Pakistan government conducts its nuclear tests
at Chagai in Baluchistan. Very little information is available
about General Musharraf ?s involvement in this process. All in
all little information is available about General Musharraf's
connections to the Pakistani nuclear program. It seems plausible
he came to know of the program during his postings to the
Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) and that being an
artillery officer he was probably indoctrinated into the raising
of the Pakistan Army's nuclear armed `2nd Artillery Division' in
1989. However as a corps commander in 1998 he would most
definitely have been part of the nuclear decision making chain,
and the 1998 tests would not have been possible without his
approval.
After the nuclear tests, the US slapped sanctions on both
Pakistan and India. The sanctions weakened the Pakistani
economy. This added to the strain between Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and his COAS General Jehangir Karamat.
Talk of a military coup wafted through the air.
October 7, 1998: In a deft political move, General Karamat
was retired and Musharraf was promoted to General and appointed
Chief of Army Staff by PM Nawaz Sharif. It is alleged that Nawaz
Sharif carried out this appointment on the recommendation of his
father Mohammed Sharif, President Rafique Tarar, and Lt. General
(r) Javed Nasir. All three of these gentlemen are part of the
Tabhlighi Jamaat, a Sunni revivalist order that is quite popular
among the officers of the Pakistani Army.
The appointment was unexpected in most quarters. His course
mate from the 29th PMA, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan then Chief
General Staff was widely regarded to be the 1st in line for
COAS. General Quli Khan felt slighted by the PM and soon
resigned from the army. Lt. General Khalid Nawaz, another senior
commander regarded by external observers as being second in line
for the COAS also resigned. At the same time that General
Musharraf was promoted, another PA officer Lt. General Khwaja
Ziauddin (an engineering corps officer) was made the Chief of
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, General
Ziauddin replaced Lt. General Nasim Rana, who was made Master
General Ordinance. General Musharraf viewed this development
dimly.
Upon becoming COAS Musharraf quickly promoted his friend from
the Siachen days, Major General Mohammed Aziz (then serving as
the DDG of the Afghan Bureau in the ISI) to Lt. General. He also
subsequently moved General Aziz to the post of Chief General
Staff. This choice stuck out because General Aziz until then had
never commanded a corps formation, this is a pre-requisite for
being CGS. As CGS General Aziz had oversight of the DG Military
Intelligence and in very sly move, General Musharraf transfered
the Afghan Bureau out of the ISI and into the DGMI.
Soon afterwards it is believed that General Musharraf
initiated covert military operations across the Line of Control
in Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. This was code named
`Operation Badr' and it utilized the same subterfuge commonly
seen in other SSG operations.
It is said that General Musharraf got his appointment because
he successfully convinced Nawaz Sharif that he ( Musharraf )
strongly supported civilian rule. As time passes on however the
relationship between General Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif soured,
and as a sign of this, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin (DG-ISI and
reputed to be connected to Nawaz Sharif?s political party the
Pakistan Muslim League) was not invited to attend the Corps
Commanders conference.
February 21, 1999: The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
signed the Lahore Declaration with the Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee. The declaration commited both sides to:
* Intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including
the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
* Refrain from intervention and interference in each other's
internal affairs.
* Intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process
for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral
agenda.
* Take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental
or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts
and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for
confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields,
aimed at prevention of conflict.
* Reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of
SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization
of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view
to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to
improve their quality of life through accelerated economic
growth, social progress and cultural development.
* Reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations and their determination to combat this
menace.
* Promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
At this point PM Vajpayee made a historic bus ride to sign the
declaration. General Musharraf kept away from Lahore sending a
strong message that the Pakistani army does not approve of the
agreement. It is only later that the world learns that all this
while General Musharraf was a busy slipping Pakistani irregulars
and soldiers across the LoC in Kargil.
April 1999: The Pakistani troops from the SSG in mufti,
paramilitary troops from the Northern Light Infantry and
irregulars from Islamist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba had
seized control of heights overlooking the National Highway-1A in
the Kargil sector. This placed them in a position to interdict
India?s lines of communication and supply to its side of the
battlefield on the Siachen glacier. This glacier was the site of
Musharraf's earlier failure. Together he and his old friend from
the SSG, Lt. General Mohammed Aziz were now determined to set
things straight.
However before the logistics needed to support this
deployment could be completed, the Indian army discovered the
intrusions by pure chance. This discovery pushed the Indian Army
into making more reconnaissance patrols and one such patrol
under the leadership of a young 2nd Lt. Saurabh Kalia (4 Jat
Regt.) in Kaksar sub-sector made contact with the Pakistani
troops. Lt. Kalia and his men were captured alive and in a
manner reminiscent of the war of 1971, they were tortured and
killed by the Pakistani soldiers and irregulars.
June-September 1999: In this period the Pakistani government
repeatedly made attempts to make it appear to the international
press that the intrusions were really the work of `indigenous
Kashmiris'. This media stunt failed.
The Indian Army slowly gained the upper hand in the ground
war in the Kargil Sector. The IAF dominated the skies and
interdicted supply lines to the Pakistani posts. This put the
irregulars in a bad tactical position. The Pakistani Prime
Minister flew to Washington DC to gain American support after
his nuclear threats failed to stop an Indian mobilization along
the international border. In Washington PM Nawaz Sharif faced a
very hostile President Clinton and had to hastily order a
withdrawal from the positions held by the Pakistan Army soldiers
and irregulars.
Pervez Musharraf was forced to recall his soldiers and the
paramilitaries that went with them. This was a body blow. His
image among the Islamists took a major beating. There were some
incidents of indiscipline as Musharraf carefully brought the
troops down from the Kargil heights.
Most political observers at this point remarked that the days
of Nawaz Sharif were numbered. The Kargil War in India left
bitter memories of a peace process betrayed. This marked General
Musharraf in the eyes of most Indian policymakers as man
unworthy of trust.
October 1999: Nawaz Sharif was well aware of the pressures
building within the government. He attempted to curb the growing
power of the generals and made swift changes to the top
echelons. The changes were not well received and when Nawaz
Sharif `sacked? General Musharraf , and tried to insert his
choice DG-ISI Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin as the COAS, the
inevitable coup was set in motion. General Musharraf was
Colombo, Sri Lanka attending a military function. News of the
changes reached him there. He rushed back to Pakistan on a PIA
flight.
In Pakistan meanwhile the Corps Commanders revolted against
the Prime Minister and on October 12, 1999 Musharraf was
`brought? to power by a coup orchestrated by his subordinates
Muzzaffar Usmani, Aziz, and Mehmood Ahmed. Brig. General
Salahuddin Satti (CO 111 Bde), a former Brigade Major from
Musharraf ?s Siachin days, assisted the plotters in their task.
He took on the role of 'Chief Executive' of Pakistan on 12th
Oct. and continued to hold the office of Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC).
One of his first acts as CE was to set Major General Zaheer
Ul Islam Abbasi free. General Abbasi then went on to form an
organization called Hizbullah, which solicited support from
serving and former army officers to set up an Islamic state in
Pakistan . Musharraf also brought back former Director
General-ISI, Lt. General Rana as Military Secretary. Apart from
this he dresses his `coup' as a `counter-coup', even going to
the extent of accusing the elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
of having attempted to hijack the airplane that He (General
Musharraf ) was traveling in. This is carefully declared a
`terrorist act' under Pakistani by his own ordinance, and then
applied retroactively to cover the case of Nawaz Sharif. To top
it all off, General Musharraf claims that this is the fifth time
he has escaped death.
Among other things a USG sponsored initiative to get Osama
Bin Laden using a specially trained squad, which was in the
works with the approval of the Nawaz Sharif govt. was cancelled
by General Musharraf .
General Musharraf also appointed his cabinet. Here he used a
mix of former military officers he was comfortable with like his
friend, the former Governor of Sindh, Lt. General (r) Moinuddin
Haider, and people with contacts to media and foreign businesses
like Shaukat Aziz (his finance minister). His internal style of
functioning with its neurotic reliance on `Army Monitoring
Teams' to monitor the working of bureaucrats alienated the Civil
Service of Pakistan . Matters were made more complicated by his
insistence on a change in the equivalence scheme for postings in
the civil service and military service. He routinely posted
junior officers into position earmarked for higher-ranking
civilian officers.
2000: Musharraf worked feverishly to build up Pakistan's
image among international lender agencies and to rebuild ties
with the United States. He shuffled his top commanders in order
to keep up appearances, moving Lt. General Aziz Khan from CGS to
CC-IV Corps (Lahore). He also rewarded his loyalists with plum
postings. He revamped the `Ehtesab Cell', making it into the
`National Accountability Bureau' and initiated a campaign of
loan and unpaid tax recovery. The `accountability? process was
accused of going easy on former military officers and pressure
mounted on General Musharraf from political classes who are
specifically targeted by the process.
This situation however took an interesting turn. So as to
render credibility to the process in the eyes of the
international community General Musharraf ordered the
publication of the results of investigation into the wealth
amassed by some former generals. Ultimately the list of the
`Robber Billionaires' of Pakistan reads like a page out of an
old Pakistani army telephone book from the Afghan war days with
former COAS General Aslam Beg and the former Corps Commander XI
Corps, Lt. General Fazle Haq in Peshawar at the top. Despite
this his relations with politicians deteriorate.
Musharraf set up a secret task force in the ISI headed by
Lt.GeneralMahmood Ahmed, the DG, and consisting of Lt.General
(r) Moinuddin Haider, Interior Minister, and Lt.General Muzaffar
Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, to break the PPP, the
MQM and the Sindhi nationalists.
In August 2000, Musharraf through track-II channels in the
Kashmiri American community he initially promoted and then
betrayed a ceasefire involving the Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM: the
military wing of the Jamaat-I-Islami-J&K). A big byproduct of
this `Hizb-ceasefire' drama was that Musharraf succeeded in
finessing Syed Salahuddin's (Head of the Hizbul Mujaheddin)
cards in the `Kashmir Great Game'. With the failure of the
ceasefire, Salahuddin?s position in the UJC (United Jihad
Council) was greatly weakened and HM cadres were left dealing
directly with their Pakistani handlers.
Late 2000 - Early 2001: He utilized the track-II channels
developed by Shirin Taher Kheli, Major General(R) Mahmud Ali
Durrani (the so called BALUSA group) and his brother Naved
Musharraf to set in motion the `Agra Peace Summit'. He deputed
Major General Ehsan-ul-Haq, DGMI to head up a special cell at
GHQ Rawalpindi that prepared the ground for this. His COS (Late)
Lt. General Ghulam Ahmed coordinated the effort from CE
secretariat. Others including Abbas Sarfaraz Khan (Min. SAFRON)
and Shaukat Aziz (Min. Fin.) are also involved.
On the cards at the summit is a proposal to install
surveillance equipment on the LoC with a scheme for cooperative
monitoring. This oddly enough appears very similar to an
American proposal that first made its appearance during Dr.
Robert M. Gates? (Dy. NSA to President George W. Bush) visit to
the region in 1991. Robert M. Gates was in the CIA during the
Afghan War and later went to head the CIA.
General Musharraf used the opportunity to rebuild ties to the
Pakistani political spectrum and met with elements of the POK
political milieu.
June 20, 2001: He used this consensus to his advantage and
eased out President Rafique Mohammed Tarar. He appointed himself
President of Pakistan , but publicly restates his commitment to
return Pakistan to `true' democracy.
July 9, 2001: A car driven by Mr. Abdul Hafeez tried to drive
into Musharraf's convoy. The car damaged either the pursuit car
or the pilot car and Musharraf somehow escaped unhurt. What is
interesting however is the absence of the any public remarks
about having `escaped death? for the sixth time.
July 15, 2001: The summit ran into difficulties but Musharraf
used the assembled Indian media to launch a `Pyswar' attack on
India. In the public eye, the summit is a failure, but it is
also reported that Musharraf's delegation handed over a list of
active Hizbul Mujaheddin `officers' to the Indian side. At least
one member of this list was killed in an exchange of fire with
Indian security forces in the next month.
July 30, 2001: He retired VCGS Major General Mohammad Anwar
Khan and appointed him as President POK. This process
marginalizes Sardar Abdul Qayyum, a veteran Kashmiri leader who
supported the Hizbul Mujaheddin Ceasefire.
September 19, 2001: General Musharraf publicly announced a
shift in the Pakistani policy. He ditched the Taliban and joined
the American led coalition against `Al Qaeeda' Terror. Soon
after he dispatched his DG-ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed to
deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban. General Ahmed failed in his
mission. Soon the US went into a shooting war with the Taliban.
General Musharraf in exchange for debt rescheduling, and other
massive cash infusions into Pakistan offered the US access to
the bases it needs for the anti-Taliban operations. He justified
this as being a strategic decision aimed at preserving the
`national interest' and informed the international press that
opposition to his decision amounts to a small fraction of the
population. Other observers however admit the General was
basically threatened with annihilation by American negotiators.
In this period he orders an exfiltration of all serving
Pakistan Army personnel in Taliban held territory. A vast number
of officers including several brigadiers, some Major Generals
and one Lt. General returned to Pakistan via land and air
routes.
October 7, 2001: The Pentagon completed its war planning and
soon the air campaign against Taliban targets in Afghanistan was
due to begin. At this time a lot of information had also
surfaced about links between the ISI and the September 11
suicide bombers. General Musharraf `sacked' his DG ISI Lt.
General Mahmood Ahmed, and his Dy. COAS Lt. General Muzzaffar
Usmani (formerly Corps Commander V Corps-Karachi). He appointed
Ehsan-ul-Haq (now promoted to Lt. Gen) as the DG-ISI. These
actions found favor in the west.
October 9, 2001: He promoted his juniors Lt. General Mohammed
Aziz and Lt. General Begami Mohammed Yousaf Khan to full
generals made them Chairman JCSC and Vice COAS respectively. He
also quickly shuffled his corps commanders around and replaced
people in the XII Corps in Quetta and the XI Corps in Peshawar.
In this month he also made Lt. General Khalid Maqbool the
governor of Punjab and moved Lt. General Jamshed Gulzar, (the
man who as Force Commander Northern Areas, helped him launch the
Kargil operation) to the post of Adjutant General. This set the
ground for large-scale promotions deeper within the army.
Summary
General Musharraf's career in the Pakistan Army was fairly
spectacular. He has consistently displayed an ability to
function within the highly politicized Pakistani Army and
utilize it to carry out aggressive tactical operations. All in
all he seems well outfitted for a political life in Pakistan .
Throughout his career he has also displayed his ability to
handle unconventional techniques of warfare. His tenure with the
SSG, with the Afghan-Jihad and the 323 Brigade at Siachen,
speaks volumes about this. His performance at the RCDS course
especially the media-handling segment also in some way alludes
to this.
How precisely he overcame the adverse remarks from two sets
of disciplinary proceedings is unclear but General Musharraf has
very close ties to the Pan-Islamists in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. He has on several occasions made common cause with
them and achieved personal advancement.
Comments on General Musharraf from various sources
1) Govt. of Pakistan :
"He remains a devoted family man and a loving father to
their two children Ayla and Bilal, both happily married. They
have a granddaughter, Mariam from Ayla. A natural sportsman, who
has always loved the outdoors and spends most of his leisure
time playing Squash, Badminton or Golf. The General also takes
keen interest in water sports, is a enthusiastic canoeist and
loves to sail. An avid reader he is well versed in Military
History, being his favorite subject."
2) Profile given to General V.P. Malik when Musharraf was
appointed COAS:
"The personality sketch described Musharraf , writes General
Malik, as "aggressive", "ambitious" with a tendency to "play to
the gallery" and "to constantly prove himself." Immediately on
taking over as COAS Musharraf carried out a major reshuffle,
signs of a man who was "purposeful" and "impatient."
3) The Kargil Review Committee:
"He ( Musharraf ) is also seen to be aggressive and
ambitious and is considered to be one of the most experienced
experts in mountain warfare in the Pakistan army."
4) Vijay Mohan quoting an intelligence assessment:
"Behind the name is a personality known to be a
professionally-bred, morally upright soldier with strong links
with fundamentalists, who, at times, can be rash and dangerous -
a well-trained officer with a wide-ranging mind, hard working
and appears to be thoughtful and shrewd in assessing future
developments. To the outside world, General Musharraf's
expression appears stern and his manner often abrupt. He is hot
headed and considered to be unpopular among his subordinates,
says one intelligence report. The report adds that he can be
rash and dangerous if he feels that a situation is going out of
his control. He does not mix freely with officers, but prefers
to interact with JCOs and other ranks - a strong personality,
who came to be known for his capability for taking definite
decisions as well as tremendous drive and tenacity. His meteoric
rise in the Pakistani army is attributed to his professional
competence and his being a Mohajir. Stockily built and of medium
height with a good soldierly bearing, the General is said to be
keen on squash, golf and shikar. Reports say that he likes
drinks, but is not over-indulgent. He is also fond of ghazals.
His wife Saheba is well educated and holds modern views on world
affairs. They have a son, Bilal, and a daughter. The family
lifestyle is not known to be extravagant."
5) Sunday Observer 1999:
"An avowed admirer of Kamal Ataturk of Turkey, the General
has shown that he can act decisively in a crisis. The
cigarette-smoking, pistol-toting image of the General that
flashed across television screens initially is now contending
with the Army Chief as a family man- with his wife, his
granddaughter - at home. General Musharraf is no visionary. He
is a hard-boiled soldier, who is aware of the damage Mr. Sharif
and his associates were causing to the body politic. The Army
Chief stood up to the civilian Prime Minister and sent him
packing."
6) B Raman (General
Pervez Musharraf - His Past and Present)
"The interviews and speeches of General Musharraf since October,
1998, show his thinking to be as follows:
- The acquisition of Kashmir by Pakistan can wait. What
is more important is to keep the Indian army bleeding in
Kashmir just as the Afghan Mujahideen kept the Soviet troops
bleeding in Afghanistan.
- Even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, there cannot be
normal relations between India and Pakistan because Pakistan
, by frustrating India's ambition of emerging as a major
Asian power on par with China and Japan, would continue to
be a thorn on India's flesh. And, so long as it does so,
Pakistan would continue to enjoy the backing of China and
Japan."
Quoting a retired US Army officer:
" Musharraf is intelligent, but Zia-ul-Haq was astute".
When I asked him to explain, he replied: "Astuteness is
the ability to apply intelligence in practice. If one took Zia
and Musharraf to a cliff and asked them to jump down, Zia would
have asked: "Why the hell should I?" But, Musharraf would have
jumped, broken his bones and then only asked himself: "Why the
hell did I?"
"General Pervez Musharraf by all accounts is all of the
following:
* A plodder.
* A good listener.
* Very loyal to subordinates who are loyal to him.
* Encourages subordinates to speak out their mind freely &
frankly.
* While continuing the ban on public political meetings &
processions, have allowed his critics to let out steam
through the media.
* Corporate style of decision-making. All important
decisions taken in consultation with Corps Commanders.
* Poor in analysis & judgement. A typical commando-- brave,
unyielding and unrelenting towards perceived adversaries and
ready to be devious for achieving his objective."
7) Asra Q. Nomani
"In this highly polarized country where immigrants from
India have formed a political party to demand more immigrant
(mohajir) rights, it's a coup of sorts for this group that
Musharraf, himself a Mohajir, has risen to power. Even his wife,
Sehba, is nothing like a mullah's wife. Unlike Bhutto, she
doesn't feel the need to drape a dupatta over her head, wearing
it over her shoulders instead in elegant outfits. She is
considered loyal and devoted -- and the woman behind this man's
success. Even bolder, he's known to prefer Johnny Walker Black
Label scotch."
"By all accounts, the Musharrafs lived a modest life, not
filled with fancy upholstered sofas. At one time, according to a
family friend, their furniture included a simple padded low
wooden platform with a red fabric over it and big pillows upon
which to rest. Their furniture often had "MES" printed on the
back, standing for government-issued stock from the Military
Engineering Services. His eldest daughter, Ayla, pursued an
unconventional field in Pakistan for women -- architecture --
going to National College of Art in Lahore. There, she was
courted by a man she eventually wed in a "love" marriage, as
opposed to an arranged one, also not the norm in this culture.
Even more surprising: The Musharrafs are Sunnis, and their
daughter married a Shiite. By accepting the marriage, they also
transcended many of the hangups of families who don't allow
their children to marry out of their specific group."
8) Ahmed Rashid (who declined an offer to join Musharraf's
foreign policy adviser)
"He's a liberal, he's a secular man, and he grew up in
Karachi, which is our most cosmopolitan city,"
9) Mark Corcoran
"He is keen to portray himself as a liberal with western
sensibilities, reassuring Washington and London that this
nuclear power is in safe pro-western hands. He is known to enjoy
the occasional drink (behind closed doors so as not to offend
Muslim sensibilities), a night on the town, and a game of
squash."
Summary
Apart from the General's family life, which is portrayed to be
the epitome of bliss and his love for sports, three basic
characteristics stand out to most observers, these are:
a) An impulsive, somewhat rash nature, given to use of rough
language, and quick decisions. Some analysts suggest that
this is related to his Special Forces tenure.
b) A strong emphasis on maintaining appearances, so as not
offend others in an Islamic Country. This includes drinking
privately etc?
c) An apparently liberal and frugal (by Pakistani standards)
personal life.
Other attributes that appear are an interest in `playacting'
and `putting on a show'. Those who have seen the General on TV
should concur with these views.
Next we discuss three other issues that this `composite'
throws some light on.
Musharraf: `AtaPak' v/s `Ataturk'
> General Musharraf makes frequent comments about his affinity
for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Father of the Turks". Here are some
of these for easy reference.
To Turkish Journalists after visiting Kemal's mausoleum:
"As a model, Kemal Ataturk [the founder of modern Turkey]
did a great deal for Turkey. I have his biography. We will see
what I can do for Pakistan.''
To Bharat Bhushan at an interview in COAS's house in
Rawalpindi:
"He did not influence my thoughts as such but I always
respect him for what he did for Turkey. And since I am a soldier
I read about him and about his campaigns to create this modern
Turkey from the Sick Man of Europe. I am impressed especially by
the campaign in Gallipoli where he, along with three hundred
thousand Turks, opposed the allies. I respect him for both his
military and political achievements in Turkey."
As most observers know however, that the key to being
`Ataturk' is to push hard for a transition from a theocratic
state to a secular state. On that matter however General
Musharraf 's utterances are more enlightening. In response to a
question from the MEI:
'Are you interested in seeing Pakistan in the model of a
secular Islamic state along the lines of Turkey'?
General Musharraf replies:
"No, not at all. This is not a secular state. As I said, our
forefathers, the founders of Pakistan, created Pakistan as an
Islamic republic. So this is not a secular state, as opposed to
Turkey. Certainly not. And I am not going to change that at all.
When I praised Ataturk, it was for what he did for Turkey - he
converted the "Sick Man of Europe" into modern Turkey. We cannot
follow exactly what he did for Turkey here in Pakistan .
Pakistan has its own environment. Therefore, we need to do
something indigenous for Pakistan, and that is what we are
doing. But I respect and admire Ataturk for what he did for
Turkey."
As Kemal Ataturk's methods left an enduring memory in the
minds of impressionable Islamists of Pakistan , in an interview
to Newsline, General Musharraf clarified his position on Kemal
Ataturk:
"Yes, I admire him. Now everyone thinks I am going to
follow everything that he did. Obviously not, He did something
in Turkey in a different environment. My role model is really
the Quaid-e-Azam (Jinnah)."
Summary
Students of history in the Indian subcontinent probably do not
find anything `new' about General Musharraf's love for all
things Turkish. This falls well within a centuries old pattern
common to Pan-Islamist leaders in the region. However a certain
section of the western media, western public policy circles and
some Pakistanis seem to have fallen for this.
The entire `AtaPak' - `Ataturk' symbolism rests on very
carefully made public statements. To General Musharraf this may
have a more direct meaning, one that perhaps dates back to
something in his childhood, i.e. the need for absolute power.
General Musharraf has long craved the power to change society on
an arbitrarily short timescale; this symbolism is a way of
expressing it in a `palatable' (to western audiences) way.
Perhaps the most obvious contrast with Ataturk is seen in
General Musharraf's sense of dress. When meeting westerners the
General prefers to wear an Armani three-piece suit, when meeting
Pakistani politicians he prefers the military uniform, and when
meeting the Pakistani public, he prefers the traditional
sherwani or his SSG camouflage fatigues. For reference Kemal
Ataturk completely abandoned his traditional garb, and wore only
western clothes.
To exactly replicate Ataturk's work, Musharraf will have to
carry out very long and brutal campaigns to marginalize and
physically eliminate the Islamists. This is impossible as the
roots of Islam are embedded deep in Pakistan.
It is possible that Musharraf may attempt to do something
that mimics vaguely the form of Ataturk to satisfy western
observers, but he is unlikely to ever stand up to serious
scrutiny.
For Pakistanis domestically Musharraf is more likely to
follow the footsteps of other Turkish leaders like General Kenan
Evren, who dismissed an elected government and subsequently
straightjacketed Turkish democracy. |
